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Abstract
For the past thirty years, nonprofits in the United States have been authorized to acquire and hold
conservation easements, which are perpetual restrictions that prevent alteration of the subject
land’s natural and ecological features. Conservation easements have presented a lower cost,
effective, far-reaching American conservation tool and proponents advocate for export of U.S.
style conservation easements to other countries. But while conservation easements could be a
useful tool for preservation of land outside the United States, they may not be the most effective
or suitable framework to advance conservation restrictions in all countries. Each country should
be able to determine whether conservation restrictions meet the economic, social, and political
needs of the country. The U.S. model is useful for examining the policy and legal issues that
arise when adopting these restrictions on land and this article will provide an analytical
framework for the major policy and legal issues that could inform a nation’s decision to adopt
private conservation restrictions based on the experience of the U.S.
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Introduction
For the past thirty years nonprofit organizations have revolutionized open space and habitat
conservation in the United States through the use of conservation easements. Pursuant to
legislation in all states, nonprofits (NPOs) have been authorized to acquire and hold perpetual
restrictions that prevent alteration of the subject land’s natural and ecological features.1 These
rights can be held “in gross,” with the result that the nonprofit owning the conservation easement
need not own land near the restricted property and can be based in a distant location. Between
2000 and 2005 land owned by (nonprofit) land trusts increased 48% to a total of 1.7 million
acres, while during that period land trusts increased their conservation easement holdings to 3.7
million acres for an increase of 148%.2 In gross conservation easements have presented a lower
cost, effective, far reaching American conservation tool.
Based on this success, in more recent years proponents have advocated the export of
conservation easements from the United States to other countries, specifically calling for or
reporting on the establishment of “conservation easements” abroad.3 A vehicle like a
conservation easement and having some or perhaps all of its attributes could be employed in
other countries to achieve various local and national conservation goals. For example,
conservation restrictions could be used for watershed protection, thus preserving drinking water;
habitat and biodiversity conservation, safeguarding threatened species for psychic or aesthetic
enjoyment or perhaps for economically beneficial ecotourism or controlled harvesting of wildlife
and plants;4 open space preservation, providing views and needed breaks in a developed or
1

See infra section I.A. describing the attributes of conservation easements.
Land Trust Alliance, 2005 National Land Trust Census Report 8 http://www.landtrustalliance.org/about-us/landtrust-census/2005-report.pdf (last visited March 27, 2010). See infra section I.C. for additional data on conservation
easements.
3
See Joanna Cope, The Conventional Wisdom on Conservation Easements in Latin America (Appearing on the
Foundations of Success website 2005), http://www.fosonline.org/Site_Documents/Grouped/SEPA-FINALEnglish22sep2005.pdf; The World Bank, World Development Report 2003, pp. 131 (“conservation easements” for
urban areas), 171 (“conservation easements” to protect natural areas) http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2002/09/06/000094946_02082404015854/Render
ed/PDF/multi0page.pdf; U.S. AID (describing its assistance in introducing “conservation easements” to Paraguay),
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/environment/country/paraguay.html, and
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/environment/climate/country_nar/paraguay.html, last visited July 26, 2010;
American Bird Conservancy, “Spectacular Hummingbird Protected by First Conservation Easement in Northern
Peru,” July 18, 2006, http://www.abcbirds.org/newsandreports/releases/060718.html; Record of Proceedings, Land
Purchase As An Intervention Strategy for Biodiversity Conservation 15, 23 (Conference hosted by IUCN NL and
The World Land Trust 2006) (suggesting use of “easements”),
http://www.worldlandtrust.org/landpurchase/pdf/2006%20Symposium%20Proceedings.pdf.
(https://www.hudson.org/files/documents/Index%20of%20Global%20Philanthropy%20and%20Remittances%20200
9.pdf). See infra section III.C.1. discussing how various interests described as “conservation easements” do not
actually meet the definition as defined in this article.
4
See Anastasia Telesetsky, Graun Bilong Mipela Na Mipela No Tromweim: The Viability of International
Conservation Easements to Protect Papua New Guinea’s Declining Biodiversity, 13 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 735,
738-41 (2000-2001); Elizabeth Garland, The Elephant in the Room: Confronting the Colonial Character of Wildlife
Conservation in Africa, 51 African Studies Rev. 51, 62 (2008) (describing efforts of rural African communities “to
assert their right to exploit wildlife through community-based conservation and tourism projects”); The Nature
Conservancy, Cuatrocienegas, Mexico: Parks in Peril End-of-Project Report 3 (describing need for habitat,
biodiversity, and species protection in Mexican state of Coahuila), http://www.parksinperil.org/files/cuatro2b.pdf;
The World Bank, World Development Report 2003, pp. 163-64 http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2002/09/06/000094946_02082404015854/Render
2
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developing landscape; soil conservation, preventing loss of key farmland through deforestation,
certain farming practices, and other activities;5 or carbon sequestration, to meet national or
global goals and perhaps for compensation from other countries or actors.6 Conservation
restrictions may also be used to address cross border concerns, such as preserving habitat in
various countries along the path of migrating birds.7 Moreover, the preservation of habitat and
views may serve cultural, heritage, and intergenerational imperatives within a given country.
My thesis, however, is that while conservation easements could be a useful tool for preservation
of land outside of the United States, they may not be the most effective or suitable framework to
advance conservation restrictions in all countries. Rather than pushing for adoption of an
American style “conservation easement” elsewhere, other countries and American (and global)
advocates of conservation devices should engage in a process to determine a given country’s
appropriate conservation toolbox. That process should be free of American legal and
conservation jargon and without a predisposition for American legal structures, values, and
policy choices. The U.S. conservation easement is useful, however, as a model to examine many
of the policy and legal issues that arise whenever adopting private, perpetual, nonpossessory
conservation restrictions on land of another. But each country must determine on its own
whether or not private conservation restrictions meet their economic, social, and political
realities and aspirations (many of which are quite different than the American experience
reflected in American conservation easements) and what attributes the device should have on key
issues such as duration, in gross enforcement, role of government, etc. These national and local
goals can then be given life by finding an appropriate legal structure, ideally consistent with the
country’s own jurisprudence and system.
This article will provide an analytical framework for the major policy and legal issues that could,
and in my view should, inform a nation’s decision to adopt private conservation restrictions.
These include cost, efficiency, preference for private vs. governmental actors, the benefits and
costs of perpetual limits on land, and public land use regulation as an alternative. Moreover,
specific issues related to other countries are examined: the tradeoff between development and
conservation, the specter of neocolonialism in exporting conservation methods and values, the
mission and capacity of the NPO sector, and the legal system. I argue that adopting an American
off-the-shelf “conservation easement” model that is inconsistent with a country’s needs and
culture will make it less likely that the conservation goals will actually be achieved and become
more real than words on paper. Finally, I demonstrate that the learning about conservation
restrictions should be a two-way street, not just the export of American methods: the views of
ed/PDF/multi0page.pdf. (giving various examples of threats to habitat across the world); see also Ralph
Blumenthal, Texas Proceeding With Plan to Auction Nature Preserve, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 2007, Sec. A, p. 12
(conservation easement permitting hunting “to maintain a sustainable population of healthy native species”).
5
See Robert Mitchell, Property Rights and Environmentally Sound Management of Farmland and Forests in John
W. Bruce et al, eds., Land Law Reform: Achieving Development Policy Objectives (2006) pages 175-226 at 176
(describing need for soil conservation).
6
See Susan Subak, Forest Protection and Reforestation in Costa Rica: Evaluation of a Clean Development
Mechanism Prototype, 26 Environmental Management 283 (2000) (describing carbon offset purchases in Costa
Rica).
7
See American Bird Conservancy, “Spectacular Hummingbird Protected by First Conservation Easement in
Northern Peru,” July 18, 2006, http://www.abcbirds.org/newsandreports/releases/060718.html; Ducks Unlimited,
http://www.ducks.org/Conservation/International/1680/InternationalMain.html, last visited July 28, 2010.
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some other countries about governmental involvement in private conservation may teach
valuable lessons to American jurisdictions about the need for an increased role of government
and the public in certain aspects ofthe selection, modification, and termination of a some
conservation easements.
I make two disclaimers up front. First, this article and other of my writings support the use of
private conservation easements in America; my critique and suggested changes in U.S. law are
intended to make these interests more effective for current and future generations.8 Second, I
do not pretend to have expertise in the law of the over 200 countries that might consider adoption
of private conservation restrictions. Rather, this article seeks to raise the questions that countries
might, and in my view should, consider when deciding whether to take such a path. In doing
exploring the issues, I refer to the law of some specific countries for illustrative purposes.
Section I discusses conservation easements in the United States and their attributes, legal
validity, and proliferation. Then Section II critically examines the policy framework inherent in
conservation easements and alternative private land restrictions that other nations may
contemplate. This section explores efficiency benefits, cost issues, the advantages and
disadvantages in nonprofit as opposed to governmental ownership, the blessings and burdens of
perpetuity, and the alternative of conservation regulation as opposed to acquisition of a property
interest. Section III assesses additional considerations for other countries in considering private
conservation restrictions: whether their NPO sectors are willing and able to take on acquisition
and stewardship of conservation interests, concerns about colonialism in adopting the policy and
legal structure of conservation easements in lieu of development, and civil law and other
domestic legal roadblocks to instituting conservation easements. In Section IV the article
critiques and compares, in light of the policy considerations that the article develops, some
alternatives to American style conservation easements (such as payments for environmental
services, usufruct, leases, etc.) that other countries could employ to impose private conservation
restraints. Finally, Section V discusses the experience of common law nations, other than the
U.S. in adopting conservation easements and differences and similarities to the American
conservation easement reflecting policy choices.
Conservation Easements in the United States
Conservation easements have emerged in the United States over the past thirty years as an
essential vehicle for private efforts in the preservation of ecological and environmental features
of land. This section will discuss the key attributes of private conservation easements in the
American experience, the legal issues involved in their validation, and the (limited) data on the
number of such restrictions.
Attributes
A definition of a private conservation in gross is essential to understand these interests as
well as the variables that can be adjusted when creating alternate conservation restrictions. The
features of the private conservation easements in gross are:
8

See infra note 13 for citations to my work.
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 a private interest, i.e., held by a nonprofit organization rather than a governmental
entity9
 restricts10 the owner of the servient (i.e., burdened) land from altering the
environmental features of the property, and is enforceable by the nonprofit organization
 a “less-than-fee” interest (i.e., a limited, nonpossessory, enforcement right), with the
servient owner otherwise retaining fee ownership of and rights to the land11
 “in gross,” i.e., the nonprofit owner of the easement does not need to own land near the
servient property in order to enforce the easement and the nonprofit can be located far
away from the servient land (i.e., no appurtenancy requirement)12
 perpetual, or at least capable of perpetual ownership
 a property interest in the holder, i.e., assertable in rem against the land itself and not
merely a contractual obligation of the servient (aka burdened) owner
 binding on successor owners of the servient property
 assignable as a property right to other nonprofits or governmental entities
 created voluntarily by the parties, not by governmental compulsion
The conservation easement developed in the United States as a response to an increased
environmental consciousness of the citizenry in light of urban, suburban, and commercial
expansion threatening pristine sites, as well as a desire for a private (i.e., non-governmental) land
interest that could promote conservation values. The concept of “conservation easement” first
appeared in the late 1950s in the United States and has become legally and popularly accepted
over the years.13 Conservation easements restrict on the owner of a property from altering the
9

For examples of governmental conservation easements, see Harris v. U.S., 19 F.3d 1090, 1092 (5 th Cir. 1994)
(federal Farmers’ Home Administration placing conservation easements); Mira Mar Mobile Cmty. v. City of
Oceanside, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 308, 318-319 (city required conservation easements to mitigate impact of proposed
building project); Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Town of Lincolnville, 786 A.2d, 619-20 (Me. 2001) (town’s
conditioning subdivision plans on developer granting conservation easement was permitted); see Frederick W.
Cubbage & David H. Newman, Forest Policy Reformed: A United States Perspective, 9 Forest Policy & Economics
261 (2005) (describing ongoing use of conservation easements by federal forest programs); Brian W. Ohm, The
Purchase of Scenic Easements and Wisconsin’s Great River Road: A Progress Report on Perpetuity, 66 J. Am.
Planning Ass’n 177 (2000) (reporting on government program began in the 1960’s).
10
Gerald Korngold, Private Land Use Arrangements: Easements, Real Covenants and Equitable Servitudes § 2.02
(2d ed. 2004) (hereafter “Korngold Private Land Use”)..
11
Korngold, Private Land Use, supra note 10, at § 2.01. The terms “fee” or “fee simple absolute” refer to the
maximum ownership interest under the Anglo-American legal system, allowing for perpetual, fully transferable,
inheritable, and devisable tenure, giving full rights of possession and power to exclude others. The use of the term
“fee” herein is meant to include analogs within other legal systems that grant maximum land ownership rights. See
generally Ugo Mattei, Basic Principles of Property Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Introduction 77
(2000).
12
Korngold, Private Land Use, supra note 10, at § 2.03.
13
William H. Whyte, Jr. popularized if not coined the phrase, and was an early proponent. William H. Whyte, Jr.,
Securing Open Space for Urban America: Conservation Easements (1959). Early influential legal writers and
supporters of conservation easements included Russell Brenneman, Private Approaches to the Preservation of Open
Land (1967); Roger Cunningham, Scenic Easements in the Highway Beautification Program, 45 Denv. L.J. 168
(1968). For a history of the land trust movement and its work on conservation easements, see Richard Brewer,
Conservancy: The Land Trust Movement in America (Univ. Press of New England 2003).
For prior work on the conservation easements, see Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A
Policy Analysis in the Context of In Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 433 (1984)
(“Conservation Servitudes”); Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Intergenerational Conflicts of Real Property Law:
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environmental, ecological, natural, open, or scenic features of the land.14 The goal is to preserve
the subject land in its current condition, free from additional development or degradation of
natural features. Easement documents often provide a general statement of purpose to protect
the property’s natural attributes and then bind the owner not to take actions that would interfere
with this purpose.15 Easements additionally include clauses barring specific actions by the owner
such as subdivision of the parcel and the erection of new buildings,16 interference with the soil
and drainage,17 and removal of timber, the building of roads, storage of trash, and use of certain
vehicles.18
Conservation easements typically do not grant access to the public to the burdened property.19
Rather, the public benefit of conservation easements is habitat protection and “visual (rather than
physical) access” over open space.20 Only in rare cases is the public granted access for
recreational use.21
Legal Validity
The path to legal validation of conservation easements was not easy, however. Under the
common law, there were several legal obstacles which some American states may have followed.
First, a “conservation easement” is not a true easement. Typically easements grant affirmative

Preserving Free Markets and Personal Autonomy for Future Generations, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 101, 125-127 (2007);
Gerald Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of Private Conservation Easements: Promoting Flexibility for the
Future and Engaging the Public Land Use Process, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 1039 (“Contentious Issues”).
Other articles on conservation easements include James Boyd, Kathryn Caballero & David R. Simpson, The Law
and Economics of Habitat Conservation: Lessons from an Analysis of Easement Acquisitions, 19 Stan. Envt’l L.J.
209 (2000); Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and Conservation
Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 Denv. U.L. Rev. 1077 (1996); Jessica O. Lippman, The
Emergence of Exacted Conservation Easements, 84 Neb. L. Rev. 1043 (2006); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking
the Perpetual Nature of Conservation Easements, 29 Harv. Envt’l L. Rev. 421 (2005); Peter M. Morisette,
Conservation Easements and the Public Good: Preserving the Environment on Private Lands, 41 Nat. Resources J.
373 (2001); Melissa K. Thompson & Jessica E. Jay, An Examination of Court Opinions on the Enforcement and
Defense of Conservation Easements and Other Conservation and Preservation Tools: Themes and Approaches to
Date, 78 Denv. U.L. Rev. 373 (2001); Christoper Serkin, Entrenching Environmentalism: Private Conservation
Easements Over Public Land, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 341 (2010); Zachary Bray, Reconciling Development and Natural
Beauty: The Promise and Dilemma of Conservation Easements, 34 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 119 (2010); Nancy A.
McLaughlin, Condemning Conservation Easements: Protecting the Public Interest and Investment in Conservation,
41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1897 (2008); Julia D. Mahoney, Land Preservation and Institutional Design, 23 J. Envtl. L. &
Litig. 433 (2008); James L. Olmstead, Representing Nonconcurrent Generations: The Problem of Now, 23 J. Envtl.
L. & Litig. 451 (2008).
14
Unif. Conservation Easement Act § 1(1), 12 U.L.A. 170.
15
See, e.g., Glass v. Comm’r, 471 F.3d 698, 703 (6 th Cir. 2006).
16
See, e.g., Glass v. Comm’r, 471 F.3d 698, 703 (6 th Cir. 2006); McLennan v. U.S., 24 Cl. Ct. 102, 104 (1991).
17
See, e.g, Goldmuntz v. Town of Chilmark, 651 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
18
See Anthony Anella & John B. Wright, Saving the Ranch: Conservation Easement in the American West 61-67
(2004).
19
See 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(d)(3)(iii) (2007) (no public access required); Brenneman, supra note __, at 100.
20
26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(ii)(B) (2007).
21
Anella & Wright, supra note 18, at 66 (“The overwhelming majority of easements grant no rights to the public to
enter the property.”); Boyd, Caballero & Simpson, supra note 6, Table 1; Elizabeth Byers & Karen Marchetti Ponte,
The Conservation Easement Handbook 21 (2d ed. 2005 Land Trust Alliance & The Trust for Public Land). See 26
C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(d)(2)(ii).
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rights, such as a right of way over the land of another.22 The conservation interest creates a
restriction on the use of the subject property, and thus is a covenant.23 Because of a historic
suspicion of the common law toward negative restrictions on land,24 with courts stating that
covenants are not “favorites of the law,”25 there was a risk that some courts might have been
biased against enforcement of conservation interests. In contrast, easements have long been
respected and routinely enforced by the courts, so that choice of the term “conservation
easement” by its proponents probably represented an attempt to bootstrap common law
acceptance for these interests.26
Second, U.S. jurisdictions are split on the enforceability of in gross interests against successor
owners of the burdened land. The traditional rule has been that burdens cannot run when the
benefit is in gross.27 A closer reading of these cases, however, might arguably allow in gross
conservation interests. 28 Moreover, the minority American view,29 now endorsed as the
recommended view by the Third Restatement of Property—Servitudes,30 permits in gross
enforcement of covenants. Indeed, at least one American court has upheld a conservation
easement based on common law principles where the enabling statute did not apply.31
Still, the important in gross feature sought by nonprofits in conservation easements is, at a
minimum, in doubt under the common law of many states. The uncertainty factor would
dissuade responsible nonprofits from expending capital, time, and expenses to acquire dubious
conservation interests.
Finally, the perpetual nature of private conservation easements—viewed by their proponents as
essential to the goal of preservation of land for future generations32 and required by the Internal
Revenue Code for income tax deductibility33—raises some potential red flags under the common
law of covenants. Where parties fail to specify the duration for a conservation easement, courts
22

Korngold, Private Land Use Arrangements, supra note 10, §2.02.
Korngold Private Land Use, supra note __, 19-20, 287-288.
24
Korngold Private Land Use, supra note __, 298-299.
25
See, e.g., Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. Conn. Packing Co., 732 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1984); Lacer v. Navajo County,
687 P.2d 404 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); Harbour v. Northwest Land Co., 681 S.W.2d 384 (Ark. 1984).
26
Under modern conceptions, covenants are viewed as valuable property interests. The Restatement (Third) of
Property—Servitudes (2000) advocates merger of easements and covenants into a single interest known as a
“servitude,” to be fully recognized and enforced by the courts as per the parties’ intent. See Susan F. French,
Highlights of the New Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, 35 Real Prop., Probate & Tr. J. 225 (2000).
Courts are not bound by the Restatement, however, and old rules and inclinations are likely to continue for some
time. See, e.g., AKG Real Estate, LLC v. Kosterman, 717 N.W.2d 835 (Wis. 2006) (specifically rejecting Third
Restatement rule on relocation of easements).
27
See Korngold Private Land Use Arrangements, supra note __, at 381 (citing cases).
28
See Korngold, Conservation Servitudes, supra note __, at 470-479, arguing that while the cases may not support
enforcement of all conservation easements they may indicate enforcement of certain ones. See in particular
discussion of Inhabitants of Middlefield v. Church Mills Knitting Co., 160 Mass. 267, 35 N.E. 780 (1894), id. 47576.
29
See cases discussed in Korngold, Private Land Use, supra note 10, § 9.15, pp. 383-388; see, e.g., Streams Sports
Club, Ltd. v. Richmond, 109 Ill. App.3d 689, 440 N.E.2d 1264, aff’d, 99 Ill.2d 182m 457 N.E.2d 1226 (1983).
30
Rest. Prop. Servitudes 3d § 2.6, comment d.
31
See Bennett v. Comm’r of Food & Agric., 576 N.E.2d 1365 (Mass. 1991) (governmental, not private,
conservation easement).
32
See Anella & Wright, supra note 18, at 153 (form document providing for perpetuity).
33
I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C).
23
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suspicious of restraints on land34 may apply a minority view that imposes a “reasonable” not
perpetual duration on the covenant.35 Even if a perpetual duration is specified, courts may use
tools of interpretation and enforcement to limit the reach of a conservation restriction.36
Therefore, private conservation easements might be legal and enforceable in some American
states under the common law but questionable or impermissible in many. As indicated above,
the uncertainty is a great disincentive for transactions. Clarity was required to allow the
conservation easement to become a powerful environmental protection tool.
As a result, proponents sought and obtained legislation in all American states that recognizes and
permits conservation easements (perhaps under different names such as conservation
restrictions.)37 The Uniform Conservation Easement Act, first promulgated by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1981, has been the model adopted by
twenty-two states.38 The Uniform Act specifically addresses questions raised by the common
law, erasing doubt, ratifying viability, or reversing rules so that conservation easements are a
fully valid interest within the jurisdiction. The Act specifically allows conservation easements to
be held by nonprofit organizations39 and can be assigned to other NPOs or governmental
entities.40 Conservation easements are valid even though they are in gross41 and negative
restrictions.42 The Act states that conservation easements are legitimate, nonpossessory property
interests43 and are treated as all other easements in terms of creation, enforceability, and
administration.44 Conservation easements are presumed to be perpetual unless limited by the
instrument creating them.45 Finally, the preface to the Act recognizes conservation easements as
part of the U.S. belief in “private ordering of property relationships as sound public policy.” 46
Conservation easement statutes have been applied by courts to uphold the validity of privately
held conservation easements. These decisions, for example, have barred fee owners from
introducing commercial recreational activities that would interfere with the property’s natural
conditions47 and found that the fee owners’ re-grading of their land violated a conservation
easement requiring them to maintain the land in its natural condition.48

34

See supra note 24 & accompanying text.
Korngold, Private Land Use, supra note 10, 436-437 (citing cases).
36
Korngold, Private Land Use, supra note 10, at 402-03.
37
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 184, §§ 31-32.
38
12 U.L.A. 170.
39
Unif. Conservation Easement Act § 1(2)(ii).
40
Id. § 4(2).
41
Id. at § 4(1).
42
Id. at § 4(4).
43
Id. at § 1(1).
44
Id. at § 2(a).
45
Id. at § 2(c).
46
Id. Commissioners’ Prefatory Note.
47
Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords, 967 A.2d 690 (Me. 2009) (easement holder was local land trust).
48
The Nature Conservancy v. Sims, 2009 WL 602031 (E.D.Ky.2009) (easement held by The Nature Conservancy).
35
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Data
There is only limited data on the number of conservation easements in the U.S. and the amount
of acres under restriction. The available numbers, however, indicate significant growth in the
number of American conservation easements. The Land Trust Alliance, the national professional
association of land trusts, reported that in 2005 local and state land trusts held conservation
easements on over 6.2 million acres, a 148 percent increase from the 2000 figure of 2.5 million
acres.49 Additionally, The Nature Conservancy reports that it holds 3.2 million acres under
conservation easement.50 Other nonprofit organizations also hold conservation easements in
addition to these two major players.51
In at least some states, the percentage of land under private conservation easements is not
insignificant. For example, 6.58% of the total land in Maine and 6.49% in Vermont are subject
to conservation easements held by land trusts only (i.e., this figure does not reflect easements
owned by other entities).52
A Policy Calculus of Conservation Easements and Alternatives
Private, perpetual conservation easements in gross bring substantial benefits but also raise policy
questions. These issues have marked the American experience with these interests and must be
closely considered by other countries contemplating the adoption of a U.S. model of easements.
Moreover, this policy calculus is also relevant to alternative private conservation vehicles that
other nations may adopt, such as payments for environmental services, real rights under civil
law, and others.53
This section will develop and apply a policy framework for analyzing private conservation
easements in gross and alternatives to achieve preservation of open space and natural habitat. It
will consider conservation easements and the following other vehicles: (1) fee ownership to
49

Land Trust Alliance, 2005 Land Trust National Census Report 5 http://www.landtrustalliance.org/about-us/landtrust-census/2005-report.pdf. A public-private partnership involving key players in conservation easements have
launched a project to create a database of U.S. conservation easements. http://www.conservationeasement.us/, last
visited July 16, 2010. The data will be developed from self-reporting by land trusts and agencies, however, id., and
there is no discussion of independent searching of recorders’ offices across the country to create a complete database
(which would be a difficult and expensive endeavor). Thus, at best, the database project, even if completed, will not
give a full picture of private conservation holdings in the U.S.
50
The Nature Conservancy,
http://www.nature.org/aboutus/howwework/conservationmethods/privatelands/conservationeasements/about/art1897
9.html, last visited July 16, 2010. See Joseph M. Kiesecker, et al., Conservation Easements in Context: A
Quantitative Analysis of Their Use by The Nature Conservancy, 5 Frontiers in Ecology & the Environment 125
(2007).
51
For example, Ducks Unlimited maintains an active conservation easement program to protect habitat.
http://www.ducks.org/Conservation/ConservationEasements/2825/ConservationEasementsandLandProtectionProgra
m.html, last visited July 16, 2010.
52
These figures are calculated by taking the numbers of acres held by land trusts according to the 2005 Land Trust
Alliance Report, Chart 5 and multiplying this number by the total acres in the state according to the U.S. Census
Bureau, State and Metropolitan Data Book, Table E-1, 2006, http://www.census.gov/compendia/smadb/TableE01.pdf (using a factor of 640 acres per square mile). Thus, Maine’s conservation easement acreage of 1,492,279 is
6.58% of 22,646,400 and Vermont’s conservation easement acreage of 399,861 is 6.49% of 6,152,960.
53
See infra Section IV discussing alternatives.
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achieve conservation purposes, (2) governmental, rather than nonprofit, ownership, (3) limited,
non-perpetual land rights, and (4) governmental regulation, instead of a property based regime,
to accomplish conservation goals. I conclude that private conservation easements in gross bring
great advantages in the U.S. and deserve continued validation and enforcement, albeit with a few
changes to achieve greater public input and protection of future generations. Other nations will
have to work within the policy framework developed below to determine their course of action.
Efficiency: Fee Ownership vs. Conservation Easements
Land could be conserved by acquiring full possessory title, i.e., fee ownership in the U.S., rather
than a conservation easement. The costs of easements generally yield lower cost conservation
than fees for both the nonprofits and the public.
Conservation Costs
Acquisition and stewardship costs for fees are higher than for easements, thus reducing the total
amount of land that can be preserved through the fee route.54 First, acquiring fee title is more
expensive as a fee purchaser must pay for the full value of the land while an easement buyer only
has to compensate for the loss of the unused development rights of the property (which the
owner may not have intended to exploit in any case).55 Moreover, many landowners choose to
donate conservation easements rather than to sell them for consideration since § 170(h) of the
Internal Revenue Code permits a federal income tax deduction for restrictions for conservation
purposed given to a qualified nonprofit.56 Thus, there may be no easement acquisition costs at
all for the NPO in the United States, with the cost subsidized by the public through the tax
deduction.57 Finally, since conservation easements have been authorized by law in all states,58
transaction costs for engaging in and enforcing such arrangements have been greatly reduced.
One might expect that acquisition cost of a less than full interest in the property in other
countries would be lower cost. Uncertainty as to land titles in general, enforceability of
conservation rights, and overall rule of law concerns, however, may effectively prevent such
conservation transactions or make transaction costs extremely high in other countries.59
Holders of conservation interests face stewardship and perhaps maintenance responsibilities. An
entity that purchases a fee for conservation purposes must, like other owners, expend funds to
generally maintain the property, engage in risk management, and also inspect it to ensure that
trespassers or visitors are not interfering with its conservation values. An easement owner,
54

R.E. Coughlin & T. Plaut, Less-Than-Fee Acquisition for the Preservation of Open Space: Does It Work?, 44 J. of
the American Institute of Planners 452 (1978). See also Paul R. Armsworth & James N. Sanchirico, The
Effectiveness of Buying Easements As A Conservation Strategy, 1 Conservation Letters 182 (2008).
55
For example, beautiful natural features may increase the value of a home on the property that may help offset the
loss of the ability to develop the property further. See Joan M. Youngman, Taxing and Untaxing Land: Open Space
and Conservation Easements, State Tax Notes, Sept. 11, 2006, at 749-51.
56
I.R.C. 170(h)(1)(B) and (C) and (h)(2)(C). See C. Timothy Lindstrom, Income Tax Aspects of Conservation
Easements, 5 Wyo. L. Rev. 1, 9-10 (2005); Stephen Small, Real Estate Developers and Conservation Easements, 19
Prob. & Prop. May/June 2005, at 24.
57
The policy aspects of this deduction will be discussed infra Section II.B.1.
58
See supra Section I.B.
59
See infra Section III.D.1.
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however, is not responsible for the general expenses. For the conservation easement to be
effective and achieve its purpose, however, the easement holder must regularly inspect and
monitor the burdened property to ensure that the terms of the easement are not being violated
(for example, impermissible building, tree cutting, commercial activities, etc.)60 This is
especially challenging not only because of the cost but also because the burdened owner is on the
property with virtually unlimited opportunities to violate the covenant.61 In order to address the
cost concern, some nonprofits require that donors of conservation easements also provide
stewardship funds.62 Still, the maintenance and stewardship costs are less for easements and
fees.
The Public
Utilizing of easements serves the goal of enhancing efficient use of our world’s limited land
resources. A conservation easement owner can accomplish its land preservation goal; at the
same time, the owner of the burdened land can make productive use of the property consistent
with the terms of the easement (perhaps as a residence, for farming, etc.) and to receive
compensation for the lost right. The easement purchaser only pays the amount of consideration
necessary to acquire the right that it needs and wants. If a fee were used, however, the fee
purchaser would be forced to “overinvest” in conservation by paying for full possessory right to
the property when a lesser restriction would have accomplished its goal. More expensive fee
purchases would mean that NPOs would be able to conserve less land with their funds. At the
same time, a property purchased in fee for conservation is taken fully out of the market.
Financial incentives for conservation raise some concerns, though. Programs of NPO purchase
of conservation easements or fees (or accepting donations with accompanying tax deductions)
may lead to strategic behavior by landowners. For example, owners may attempt to “extort”
direct or indirect payments by threatening to destroy environmental features on their land.63 The
conservation environmental purchaser must also avoid overpaying when the landowner has no
current plans to develop, since the owner has no current opportunity costs and is only selling the
future option value of the land.64 Finally, payments for conservation easements may also

60

See Anthony Anella & John B. Wright, Saving the Ranch: Conservation Easement Design in the American West
13-143 (2004).
61
For discussion of easement violations, see Jeff Pidot, Reinventing Conservation Easements: A Critical
Examination and Ideas for Reform 18-19 (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 2005).
62
See Anella & Wright, supra note 60, at 28; Elizabeth Byers & Karin Marchetti Ponte, The Conservation Easement
Handbook 126 (2d ed. 2005).
63
See Sven Wunder, Necessary Conditions for Ecosystem Service Payments 55(2008)
http://www.rff.org/Documents/08_Tropics_Conference/Tropics_Conference_Papers/Tropics_Conference_Wunder_
PES_markets.pdf. (hereinafter Wonder (2008)); Paul Ferraro, Global Habitat Protection: Limits of Development
Interventions and A Role for Conservation Performance Payments, 15 Conservation Biology 990, 997 (2001).
64
One way for a nonprofit with limited funds to purchase easements and a number of potential easements to acquire
would be to conduct an auction among the landowners of the available conservation dollars. Paul J. Ferraro,
Asymmetric Information and Contract Design for Payments for Environmental Services, 65 Ecological Services 819
(2008).
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undermine a conservation ethic already observed by the landowner based on non-monetary
values.65 But these are issues with both fee and easement purchases.
Recommendation
The use of a less than fee interest for conservation protection has tremendous advantages and
few if any disadvantages. These interests promote an efficient use of the world’s limited land
resources while providing a vehicle to achieve ecological protection. In the U.S., the
conservation “easement” has been an effective and legally valid vehicle. Other countries,
however, can develop a conservation restriction with similar attributes within their own legal
systems.
Nonprofit vs. Governmental Ownership
Costs
Nonprofit ownership of conservation easements means that government does not have to bear
direct expenses to acquire and steward conservation easements.66 In an era of tight governmental
budgets and cuts, private resources may be essential (if not the only way) to sustain open space
and habitat conservation.67 There are, however, significant tax subsidies to private conservation
easements that in effect transfer acquisition costs to the federal, state, and local government.
The federal income tax deduction for contributions of qualifying conservation easements under
IRC § 170(h)68 yielded a tax expenditure by the U.S. Treasury for 2007 of approximately $700
million.69 There are additional Treasury losses as conservation easements lower the value of
property subject to federal estate taxes.70 There are also state and local tax subsidies. The
imposition of a conservation easement reduces the property’s assessment for state and local ad
valorem (property) tax purposes because of its limited potential use.71 This forces the local
government to cut back services because of diminished revenue or to increase the tax rate on
other citizens.72 Moreover, some states give state income tax deductions or credits for
conservation easement donations.73 These government subsidies are additional expenditures that
65

Sven Wunder, Necessary Conditions for Ecosystem Service Payments 4 (2008)
http://www.rff.org/Documents/08_Tropics_Conference/Tropics_Conference_Papers/Tropics_Conference_Wunder_
PES_markets.pdf. (hereinafter Wonder (2008)).
66
See Byers & Ponte, supra note __, at 9-10.
67
See Grants That Saved Historic Relics Now Endangered, NY Times, Mar. 7, 2010 (reporting on proposed federal
budget cuts in fund preserving American historical artifacts).
68
See supra Section I.B.
69
In 2007 almost $2 billion in deductions were taken in conservation easements. Pearson Liddell Janette Wilson,
Individual Noncash Contributions, 2007, Figure B at 54, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/10sprbulindcont07.pdf.
This would mean a public revenue loss of approximately $700 million (as donors are in high brackets).
70
26 C.F.R. § 25.2703-1(a)(4) (2007).
71
See, e.g., Jet Black, LLC v. Rout County B. of County Comm’rs, 165 P.3d 744, 750-51 (Colo. App. 2006);
Gibson v. Gleason, 798 N.Y.S. 2d 541, 545 (N.Y. 2005); Daniel S. Stockford, Property Tax Assessment of
Conservation Easements, 17 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 823 (1990).
72
A fee purchase by government or a nonprofit organization will take the property entirely off the tax rolls for the
purposes of state and local ad valorem property taxation as government and nonprofits are exempt from tax.
73
For credits, see N.Y. Tax law § 210(38); N.C. Gen.Stat. § 105-151.12. Deductions are usually reflected not by a
specific state tax code provision but by the state tracking the federal income tax structure and its deductions. See
Jeffrey O. Sundberg & Richard F. Dye, Tax Property Value Effects of Conservation Easements, Lincoln Institute of
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must be calculated in the true cost of private conservation easements. Other countries adopting
similar tax subsidies must consider these costs.74
The Ethos of Private Action
Part of lore and reality is that Americans tend to rely more on individual and private sector
solutions to communal problems and less on governmental intervention than other countries do.75
For many Americans, this belief is manifested as well in a normative preference that private
rather than governmental holding of land increases social welfare.76 Americans generally value
the personal freedom of allowing owners to do what they want with their property and so achieve
personal satisfaction, subject to others’ rights and the rare imposition on this right by the law for
overriding reasons.77
This American belief in private action and personal freedom, especially with respect to land
arrangements, directly supports the adoption and use of private conservation easements in
gross—it is a comfortable fit.78 Moreover, there is a belief that a conservation easement held by
a nonprofit will be more secure and permanent since NPOs, unlike government officials, are not
subject to the political and financial pressures of pro-development forces demanding the
watering down of an easement.79
For other countries, however, private ownership and administration of conservation rights may
not fit with cultural, social, and political values. Other nations may have a preference for
reliance on government action and provision of environmental protection.80 This is in addition to
questions about the capacity of the nonprofit sector, a matter which is discussed below.

Land Policy Working Paper WP06JS1, at ns. 15-16 & accompanying text,
http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/PubDetail.aspx?pubid=1128.
74
See Commonwealth of Australia, Income Tax Assessment Act of 1997, § 31.5 (providing for a deduction for a
perpetual conservation covenant that decreases the market value of the property, subject to other conditions);
Western Australian Consolidate Acts, Land Tax Assessment Act of 2002, § 41 (providing for a land tax exemption
for any year where land is used solely or principally for the conservation of native vegetation).
75
Helmut K. Anheier & Lester M. Salamon, “The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative Perspective” Walter W. Powell
& Richard Steinberg (eds.), The Non-Profit Sector, pp. 89-114, at 90 (2d ed. Yale Univ. Press 2006).
76
See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 33 (6 th ed. 2003); see also Richard A. Epstein, Takings:
Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 5 (1985) (“the end of the state is to protect liberty and
property”).
77
See Loeb v. Watkins, 240 A.2d 513, 516 (Pa. 1968) (“Where a man’s land is concerned, he may impose … any
restrictions he pleases.); James W. Ely, Jr., The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of
Property Rights 17 (2d ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1988); see also John Stith, A View for the Ages, Post Standard
(Syracuse, NY), Nov. 30, 2009, A4, 2009 WLNR 24277909 (describing growth of local land trust).
78
See Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1353, 1359
(1982); Unif. Conservation Easement Act, Commissioners’ Prefatory Note (“There are both practical and
philosophical reasons for not subjecting conservation easements to a public ordering system. … If it is the intention
to facilitate private grants that serve the ends of land conservation and historic preservation, moreover, the
requirement of public agency approval adds a layer of complexity which may discourage private actions.)
79
See generally James M. Buchanan, Constraints on Political Action, in Public Finance and Public Choice (James
M. Buchanan & Richard Musgrave eds. 1999) (reviewing public choice theory and pressures on politicians).
80
See infra Section III.A comparing the nonprofit sectors.
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Class Issues
Despite the benefits of nonprofit action in the American context, there is a risk of elitism in the
decision making and composition of nonprofits boards controlling conservation easements.
Conservation easements can in effect achieve “private large lot zoning” and prevent the building
of affordable housing or environmentally friendly planned unit developments.81 Thus,
conservation easements may result in an increase of neighborhood exclusivity, the barring of
newcomers, and the frustration of new ideas in residential communities.
William H. Whyte, the early promoter of conservation easements, cautioned against the “muted
class and economic conflicts” inherent in conservation easements.82 He posited that the “gentry”
would be the donors of conservation easements and would have an interest in natural areas in the
countryside rather than open space for parks and playgrounds that middle income citizens would
prefer. Thus, there is a danger that nonprofit organizations seeking conservation easements may
represent and adopt the “gentrified” viewpoint, a position that does not encompass the broader
population. Yet, under a regime of private conservation easements, the nonprofit board is
invested with significant power over communal land decisions affecting the entire citizenry. In
contrast, if government owned such conservation easements, all voters could express their views
through a democratic process on choices relating to conservation easement acquisition and
administration.
Creation of Easements
By not requiring governmental action in the creation of conservation easements and permitting
NPOs as holders,83 the American models allows for NPOs to react nimbly to conservation needs
and the market. This process is likely to be more efficient allowing the preservation of land that
might slip through the bureaucratic cracks of a governmental program. Nonprofits can respond
quickly to a threatened development of a property with high ecological value and get an
easement deal in place.
There is a cost, however, to independent private action by nonprofits. Private groups have
virtually unlimited discretion in purchasing or accepting donations of easements and are not
bound to follow standards or a general conservation plan in these decisions.84 NPOs may accept
any conservation easement that appears on its doorstep, even though it is of doubtful
81

See Miriam Jordan, In Tony Monterey County, Slums and a Land War, Wall St. J., Aug. 26-27, 2006, A1 (dispute
between environmentalists seeking to preserve scenery and supporters of development of lower income housing for
immigrant workers).
82
Whyte, supra note 13, at 37.
83
Massachusetts is the only American state requiring government approval (local and state) to approve a
conservation easement before its creation. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 184, §§ 31-32.
84
The Uniform Act only states values inherent in conservation easements and does not provide standards. § 1(1).
IRC § 170(h) provides only minimal requirements for deductibility, not an optimal level. For example, to qualify
for an open space deduction the easement must only provide “scenic enjoyment” with a “significant public benefit.”
26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(i), (ii) and (iv). The factors to define these terms set out in the Regulations are vague
and highly elastic, giving wide latitude. See Korngold Contentious Issues, supra note 13, at 1067-1070 (dealing
with these tax standards). “Best practices” followed by many land trusts and provided by the Land Trust Alliance
are not binding. See Land Trust Alliance, Standards and Practices (2004),
http://www.lta.org/sp/land_trust_standards_and _practices.pdf.
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environmental benefit. Governmental officials are accountable to the citizens for their
conservation easement decisions through the election and recall processes. Nonprofits and
individual actors lack this public accountability.
Furthermore, the various nonprofits do not acquire or accept easements pursuant to a public land
use and conservation plan. As a result, the sum of conservation easements in an area may be less
than its parts—there could be a patchwork of easements that do not equal an effective
community-wide conservation plan.85 Thus, the decisions and missions of non-accountable
individuals and nonprofits, rather than community preferences, could drive open space and
habitat preservation acquisition and management in a given area. In comparison, in the arena of
public land use controls the modern trend is away from localized planning to county, statewide,
and regional approaches to environmental issues.86 Especially with the significant tax subsidies
for the creation and continuation of conservation easements in the U.S. context,87 it is fair to ask
whether the public’s interest is being maximized by an uncoordinated private system.
In Gross Ownership
In gross ownership of conservation easements has the benefit of allowing nonprofits to engage in
far-reaching conservation efforts and freeing them from the expense and difficulty of acquiring
neighboring land to which a conservation easement must be anchored. In gross ownership,
however, exacerbates the concern over private control as it allows a distant nonprofit to own
easements that affect a community.88 Thus, local land use decisions and choices can be
controlled by an entity that has little or no stake in the economic and social issues facing a
community.
Lessons Learned for All Countries
NPO ownership of conservation easements presents great opportunities but also some risks. I
have suggested in earlier work that I believe that the risks in the creation of conservation
easements have been understated and that some adjustments in the U.S. model would make these
interests even more effective. Primarily, I have urged that the federal income tax deduction for
conservation easements should only be granted if the easement is approved by local, state, or
federal authorities as being consistent with a governmental conservation plan.89 This will ensure
that the public financial investment through the tax subsidy is being well spent, with the
easement being a part of a valid conservation goal. Such a process would also provide for
community input through the election of local officials who approve the conservation plans. The
requirement of approval is consistent with the treatment of historical easements where prior

85

See Heidi J. Albers & Amy W. Ando, Could State-Level Variation in the Number of Land Trusts Make Economic
Sense?, 79 Land Economics 311, 312 (2003) (“local land trusts specializing in providing open space do not consider
the impact of their decisions on regional conservation benefits;” “lack of coordination” among land trusts “has
become a serious problem.”).
86
See Anthony Downs, New Visions for Metropolitan America 26-30, 132-134 (1994); Robert Fishman, The Death
and Life of American Regional Planning in Bruce Katz (ed.), Reflections on Regionalism 107-123, at 107 (2000).
87
See supra Section II.B.1 discussing initial deductions for donations and ongoing property tax savings.
88
See supra Section I.A defining in gross ownership.
89
Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 13, at 1066-1070.
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governmental approval of the significance of the building or site is needed for a deduction.90
Finally, freedom of choice of owners is being maintained as owners may still donate
easements—the public simply won’t pay for those that do not serve a defined public interest.
Both the U.S. and other countries can learn from each other’s views on the governmental/private
organization dichotomy. For those nations that tend to prefer governmental provision of
services, the significant benefits of nonprofits owning conservation easements may encourage
experimentation with these nongovernmental actors and interests. American jurisdictions might
learn from other countries about the value of governmental participation in the conservation
easement process and consider ways to inject governmental involvement consistent with a
private action model.
The Blessings and Burdens of Perpetuity
Perpetual duration is the gold standard for American conservation easements.91 Proponents
value infinite conservation easements as they preserve the land forever, leaving the habitat and
open space benefits for future generations. In contrast, conservation easements (or alternatives)
with limited durations will not protect the land into future.
Perpetuity, though, has its disadvantages. First, the environmental value of particular parcels and
community needs change over time. Land once thought important for habitat or open space may
no longer be necessary or viable and other environmental priorities may emerge.92 For example,
a parcel of land might be best suited to use for production of alternative energy such as a solar
panel field93 or a wind farm94 even though it would violate a conservation easement preventing
changes in the natural features of the property including the erection of structures. Moreover,
there may come a time when the public interest would be better served by allowing a parcel of
land to be shifted to a use that would violate a conservation easement on the property. For
example, there may be a communal need for affordable housing or economic development in a
depressed area.95

90

I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A) (iv), Inc. Tax Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(5)(iii); see Herman v. Comm’r, 2009 WL 2923945 (U.S.
Tax Ct. 2009).
91
See supra Section I.A.
92
See statement of Healy Hamilton, director of the California Academy of Sciences: “[w]e have over a 100-year
investment nationally in a large suite of protected areas that may no longer protect the ecosystems for shich they
were formed.” Cornelia Dean, The Preservation Predicament, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 2008, B1. Consider also how
maintenance regimes might need to change. For example, assume a conservation easement that bars the use of
pesticides on the property but over time the land is threatened by an invasive plant species. Non-chemical
techniques to control the invasive species fail. Can the NPO use pesticides in order to preserve the original plant
ecosystem that the donor wished?
93
See Todd Woody, Desert Vistas vs. Solar Power, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 2009, B1 (report unclear whether
conservation interest was a fee or easement but conflict would be the same in either situation).
94
See Eileen M. Adams, Resident to Decide on Town Ownership of Lots, Sun Journal (Lewiston, Me.), Dec. 1,
2009, 2009 WLNR 24232103 (town meeting to vote on release of conservation easement to allow wind farm).
95
For a more prosaic example, see Stephen Beale, Dog Park Site Denied in Bedford Due to Easement, The Union
Leader (N.H.), July 23, 2008 (land trust holding conservation easement denied use of land for dog park sought by
town).
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If the conservation easement were owned by a governmental entity, the decision to modify the
easement would be made in the public arena by the voters or their elected representatives.96
With private conservation easements in gross, however, a non-elected, non-representative
nonprofit, perhaps located in a different city would be making this decision. There is no
opportunity for public input to the nonprofit’s decision and no accountability through the
electoral process. The nonprofit’s unitary mission of conservation may not encompass the
flexibility that the community needs to implement other values.97
The danger of perpetual conservation restrictions can be ameliorated if there are ways to modify
the duration in those rare and extraordinary cases when the public interest requires. First, the law
must be made clear that nonprofit directors are shielded from liability if they modify a particular
easement as long are true to the overall mission of the nonprofit.98 This will make directors
willing to modify or even terminate restrictions in special circumstances. Second, the courts can
be more aggressive in applying traditional covenant modification doctrines to conservation
easements. For example, the doctrine barring enforcement of covenants violating public policy
might be employed to deal with the affordable housing, economic development, or alternative
energy scenarios described above.99 The doctrine of relative hardship, which limits enforcement
to monetary damages rather than an injunction, could be applied by a court to limit a nonprofit’s
remedy where the public interest is at stake and in effect force a buyout of the easement.100
Finally, the cy pres rule could be applied to modify a conservation restriction held by a charitable
corporation when the interest of the public would be served.101 American jurisdictions and other
countries would be well advised to consider adoption or strengthening of these doctrines when
instituting perpetual conservation rights.
Regulation Instead of A Property Right
As an alternative to the acquisition of a conservation property right by a nonprofit or
government, government could enact regulations to preserve the environmental values of land.
Public regulation has various benefits. It theoretically is the culmination of a transparent, public
process where the citizenry can exert control through their duly elected representatives.
Regulation can be based on thoughtful study and professional planning as to environmental goals
96

See, e.g., Friends of Shawangunks, Inc. v. Clark, 754 F.2d 446, 452 (2d Cir. 1985); see Trent Spiner, Hopkinton
Preserves Farmland; Special Town Meeting Approves Conservation Easement, Concord (N.H.) Monitor, Dec. 6,
2009, 2009 WLNR 24663601 (describing New Hampshire town meeting to determine whether town should invest in
a farmland conservation easement).
97
Market solutions are not likely to work to remove undesirable easements since conservation groups rarely sell
conservation rights and may face regulatory issues if they do. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 13, at
1064-1065. Eminent domain of the easement may no longer be a viable solution to acquit the public’s interest in the
post Kelo era as state legislators and state courts have increasingly limited takings for economic development and
have required blight (not likely present in conservation land). See id. at 1081-83.
98
Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 13, at 1072.
99
For discussion of termination and modification of covenants violating public policy, see Korngold, Private Land
Use, supra note 10, § 10.02. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 13, at 1080.
100
See Bjork v. Draper, 886 N.E.2d 563, 575 (Ill. App. 2008) (requiring balancing of the equities in enforcement of
conservation easement); Fox Chapel v. Walters, 2007 WL 2266684 (D.Ky.2006) (denying temporary restraining
order as plaintiff did not show balance of hardships favoring it); Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 13, at
1078-1079.
101
Korngold Contentious Issues, supra note 13, at 1078.

16

and tactics. Moreover, flexibility is retained as regulations can be modified to address newly
arising concerns.
There are significant disadvantages to the regulation approach, however, that make a propertybased solution superior. First, with a regulatory approach, all benefits of private initiative and
action are lost.102 Government wheels may move too slowly if at all to adequately preserve
threatened land.
Moreover, regulation may not be permanent enough to adequately protect the environment.
Government officials are subject to short term pressures and interest groups lobbying to remove
protective land regulations. These forces might include the need to raise revenue to cover short
term deficits by increasing the tax base through development, developers and owners seeking to
maximize the values of their parcels, and election fundraising. Facing these current pressures,
government officials might compromise the long term preservation goals of the community by
repealing or modifying land protection regulation.
The presence of a land right, such as a conservation easement gives a greater sense of psychic
and legal permanence than a land regulation. Regulations can be repealed by legislative bodies.
In contrast, sale of real property held by cities and towns can be prohibited or subject to certain
conditions.103
Conservation regulations impose nonconsensual limitations on property owners, in direct
contrast to conservation easements which are agreed to by the parties. Nonconsensual
restrictions are less desirable as they may give rise to claims by the owners for compensation
under regulatory taking theory,104 create ill will among the community, and lead to a flouting or
subversion of the regulation by a disgruntled owner.105 There may be some equal protection or
“reverse” spot zoning claims if the legislature restricts some individual parcels more than
neighboring ones.106
Regulation, therefore, lacks many of the benefits of private land restrictions. Relying solely on a
governmental regulatory approach may not yield the most effective preservation model.
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See supra Section II.B.
See Am. Jur.2d Mun. Corp. § 486 (discussing limits on property held for the public, arguably including
governmental conservation easements); N.Y. Jur.2d Parks § 143; N.Y. Gen. City Law § 20(2) (barring sale of park
lands).
104
See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (beginning the modern era of
Supreme Court land regulatory takings cases).
105
See Charles E. Di Leva, The Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources Through Legal and Market-Based
Instruments, 11 RECIEL 84, 90-91 (2002) (describing a situation of ignoring of public conservation regulation in
Brazil).
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See Palmer Trinity Private School, Inc. v. Village of Palmetto Bay, 31 So.3d 260, 262 (“reverse spot zoning
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virtually all of the adjoining owners are not subject to such a restriction”) (Fla. App. 2010); Andrews v. Town of
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Additional Considerations for Non-U.S. Conservation Easements
In addition to the general policy considerations involved in private conservation easements
discussed in the prior section, there are some specific issues when countries outside of the United
States consider adopting private conservation easements in gross (or a similar alternative based
on local law). These include whether the NPO sector in the given nation has the capacity and
willingness to assume ownership and stewardship of conservation rights, the specter of
colonialism when a country’s goal of resource use conflicts with an American legal vehicle and
conservation values, and the country’s legal system can accommodate an in gross private
conservation restriction.
Differences in Nonprofit Sectors and Activities
The size, structure, culture, and missions of nonprofit organizations in the United States have
made them suitable, prepared, and willing to generate conservation easement donations and
acquisitions and to subsequently steward these interests. Differences in the culture and histories
of other countries have led to varying nonprofit structures and functions. As a result, the
American model of nonprofits holding conservation easements may not necessarily be
appropriate or effective in other settings.
The American NPO Sector
In the United States, nonprofit organizations were and remain well suited to take on the
acquisition and stewardship of conservation easements. There is particular strength in land trusts
and related environmental organizations.
In General
The nonprofit sector in the United States is large, robust, and part of the national fabric,
providing health, education, welfare, arts, and other services. “The scale of the nonprofit sector
is larger in the United States than in most other countries.”107 There were at least 1.4 million
nonprofits in the United States as of 2004, representing a 27.3% increase from 1995.108 Total
assets in 2005 were $3.4 trillion, representing a 125% increase109 (but, of course, this does not
account for the 2008 financial and endowment meltdown.) Only three other countries have a
higher percentage of employment in the nonprofit sector than the U.S.110
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Land Conservation Organizations
The environmental nonprofit sector is strong in the U.S. In 2005, there were 13,399 public
charities addressing “environment, animals”—the IRS category. This represented 4.3% of all
public charities, having $31.6 billion in assets.111 Care must be taken with these numbers,
though, as this category would appear to include animal protection organizations and not only
groups devoted to land conservation and the environment.
There had been a considerable history of nonprofit involvement in American land conservation
by the time the private conservation easement movement began to gain strength in the 1970’s.
Groups advocating and lobbying for governmental land conservation, preserves, and parks have
existed for over a century. The Sierra Club was founded by the legendary John Muir in 1892—
just over 100 years after the forming of the American republic—and currently has 1.3 million
members.112 Other nonprofit organizations were established beginning in the nineteenth century
to acquire and hold land for conservation purposes. The first nongovernmental land trust—the
Trustees of Public Reservations—with a mission to acquire and hold “for the benefit of the
public, beautiful and historic places in Massachusetts.” was created in 1891.113 Land trusts, and
other land conservation organizations (such as the various Audobon societies), were established
across the country.114 As of 2005, the Land Trust Alliance reported 1,667 member land trusts.115
The Nature Conservancy, founded in 1951 but with roots extending back to an organization
established in 1915,116 began acquiring land for conservation purposes in 1955 and continues to
be a major holder of conservation lands and facilitator of collaborative land conservation
transactions.117
Nonprofits in Other Countries
While nonprofits have proven to be capable holders of conservation easements in the United
States, before other countries adopt private conservation restrictions it must be determined
whether their nonprofits are willing and able to acquire and hold these interests. There are issues
of mission and capacity.
Mission
The first question is whether conservation easements might be embraced within the missions and
structures of NPOs in other nations (where they are often referred to as “nongovernmental
entities,” or NGOs). It has been demonstrated that nonprofit organizations, their roles and
missions differ between countries, and that these differences are a function of different cultures,
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histories, and values. For example, the U.S. form of voluntarism and nonprofit organizations
grew out of a compromise between American values of individualism and collective
responsibility.118
The NPO sector of other countries vary from the U.S. model according to factors such as a
higher degree of state-provided social, cultural, educational, and health services; religious
influences; varying amounts of civil liberties; less adherence to a capitalist model; increased
communitarian focus; tribal traditions; and other factors.119 Differing values in various
countries also explain a related phenomenon—the degree of involvement in voluntary
associations.120 Anheier and Saloman suggest that the particular current structure of the NPO
sector reflects a country’s history.121 They identify four different NPO national models: liberal
(low government social welfare spending, with a large nonprofit sector), social democratic
(extensive state sponsored and delivered social welfare, with limited nonprofit sector),
corporatist (sizeable government social welfare spending, with a sizeable nonprofit sector, and
statist (limited public social welfare, with limited nonprofit development).122 The authors cite
examples of nations following the models arguably include: liberal-- the U.S., the U.K.,
Australia; social democratic-- Sweden, Norway, Finland, Italy; corporatist-- Germany, Belgium,
the Netherlands, France; statist—Japan, Brazil, “much of the developing world.”123 In countries
following models with limited nonprofit development and activity, there may not be adequate
organizations with sufficiently broad missions to acquire and steward conservation easements.
Moreover, there may be a preference in particular societies for government, rather than private
associations, to assume environmental activities. For example, early on France centralized
historic preservation planning under a government agency, the Commission des Monuments
Historiques, while in England such activities were handled by nongovernmental groups.124
Capacity
There is also the issue of capacity—are there enough nonprofits and resources in other countries
to take on a role with conservation restrictions even if this activity fits within the their missions?
Data on the size of the non-U.S. NPOs is limited. Available indicators, however, show a smaller
sector when compared to the U.S. For example, the average percentage of the nonprofit
workforce in the economically active population of thirty-five nations (including advanced
industrial, transitional, and developing countries worldwide) is 4.4%.125 The number for the
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United States, in contrast, is 9.8%.126 In addition to the relative smaller size of the NPO sector in
other countries compared to the U.S., the nonprofit sector is relatively larger in the developed
countries outside of the U.S. as compared to the less developed and transitioning countries.127
Unless there is external assistance, this might mean that land conservation efforts (as well as
other NGO activities) are less likely to be provided in those countries that arguably have the
greatest need and opportunity for habitat preservation.
While there are indications that the size of the NPO sector outside the U.S. is growing,128 the
current capacity of the nonprofit sphere in a given country may be insufficient to take on a
conservation easements program. For example, as of 2005 there were only seven land trusts in
Latin America,129 compared to the 1,667 in the United States.130 Proponents of private land
restrictions may have to wait until a particular county’s nonprofit arena is willing and able, if
ever, to embark on this program. And these proponents must recognize as well that for many
countries, conservation easements held by nonprofits will never be a viable, let alone the
preferred, means to preserve habitat and open space.
The Specter of Colonialism
The underlying ethic of conservation easements raises important social, political, and equity
questions for a country considering whether to embrace these interests. Some countries may
choose to embrace development to a higher degree than developed nations and reject
conservation as a “Western” priority. These issues must be addressed or a conservation easement
program will likely have little chance of success.
Environmental Equity and Global Agreements
There is an understandable concern in countries that suffered through colonialism, perhaps
lasting centuries, about control of their resources and legal systems by external forces. These are
often developing nations that are trying to increase their standards of living through the use of
their natural resources among other means. Calls from developed nations for land conservation
for purposes ranging from aesthetic to carbon sequestration are often met skeptically by those
countries trying to improve the lives of their citizens to acceptable living standards.131 They
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wonder why the burden of non-development should fall on them. This tension has played out in
various global environmental initiatives between governments, such as the Kyoto protocol where
developing nations fear they will be allocated inadequate carbon emission levels to permit
industrialization.132 Environmental equity issues have made finalization of international
agreements difficult.133
Private Conservation Easements in the Developing World. There may be similar concerns with
global initiatives promoting private conservation restrictions. Neo-colonialism, cultural, and
market issues must be considered.
Neocolonialism
If the introduction of conservation easements is seen as part of an attempt of the developed world
via the instrument of NGOs to achieve preservation at the expense of the aspirations of
developing countries, the likelihood of adoption of this private conservation technique will
decrease. This will mirror the conflict that William H. Whyte warned of with conservation
easements in the U.S. between the “gentry” favoring undisturbed open space and the rest of the
population seeking accessible recreational (or even developable) land.134
Some local parties have raised questions about the activities of international NGOs-- i.e.,
transnational, nongovernmental organizations devoted to human rights, environmentalism,
economic development, and other causes—similar to concerns voiced about actions of foreign
governments.135 Critics have charged international NGOs with imposing Western biases on other
countries, preferring universal principles to local practices and cultures, and engaging in
“cultural imperialism.”136 The imposition of conservation on the developing world by global
NGOs might be viewed by some as motivated by a desire to yield environmental and psychic
benefits for the developed world, regardless of any constraints this may cause for the host
country. This may not in fact be the impetus of NPOs and NGOs promoting conservation
easements, and there is much that demonstrates that these organizations operate for salutary and
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altruistic motives. But the burdens imposed by conservation restrictions are indeed real, and
negative perceptions must be countered.
Culture and Law
The drive to introduce American-style conservation easements to other countries could trigger
additional resistance if, as in much of the world, the traditional “conservation easement” is legal
concept that diverges from the host nation’s legal system and property rights matrix and is
viewed as a “foreign” device that is being imposed.137 Also, there might likely be problems
enforcing new formal legal rules that are inconsistent with informal local practices and norms,138
especially if the formal rule is viewed as serving foreign interests.
Private conservation easements may run up against historical conflicts in a given country. For
example, some countries are still addressing a pattern of a small number of large landholders and
a large, unlanded population. In response, one country instituted a reform that makes land that is
not cultivated or ranched subject to expropriation (and ultimate redistribution); there is a risk that
land held for conservation purposes could be so seized.139
Efficacy of Market Solutions
It must be determined whether the market model of conservation easements—where the
landowner is compensated for foregoing development rights—is viable or appropriate in a
particular country and culture. Experience with environmental treaties between nations has
shown that payments have not “trickled down” to the affected landowners. Typically payments
made by other nations to restrict development to achieve carbon sequestration or habitat
preservation are made to the government and do not get in the hands of the people who actually
live in the area and are losing resources from the new measures.140 This may often lead to
discontent between those individuals and global environmental goals and subsequent
enforcement issues.141
Additionally, a Western, market incentive system of conservation may clash with local values. It
has been argued that existing nonmonetary (e.g., communal, cultural) pressures for
environmental preservation of land may be preferable and more effective than monetary
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means.142 Moreover, introducing cash payments may undermine existing conservation
customs.143
Possible Approaches
The decision as to whether a given nation should adopt private conservation restrictions of some
variety is one that should be made alone by that sovereign nation. When proposing or
recommending (as advisers) conservations easements in other countries, care must be taken to
engage and collaborate with the host country to examine if the model (or some variation) can
work. The economic interests, people, culture, priorities, norms, and legal systems of the host
country must be recognized and respected, while solutions to broad based conservation goals are
sought.144 Even if a landowner voluntarily agrees to a restriction and receives compensation for
it, the limitation will likely be more successfully enforced if there is a demonstrable, clear benefit
to personal, local, and national interests.
If a country turns to outside advisers or partners on conservation restriction issues, these advisers
and partners must clearly respect the national autonomy of the host country in advising on
models and in eventual conservation restriction projects. Indeed there are examples of
sophisticated global NGOs (such as The Nature Conservancy) laudably working in partnership
with local interests to achieve a preservation goal that meets the needs of the host country and
region.145 These collaborative efforts by private groups are analogous to “community natural
resources management” or “community-based conservation, where the central government
involves local or indigenous institutions or people in conservation decisions as it attempts to
balance traditional values, development goals, and conservation methods.146 Approaching open
142

Sven Wunder, Necessary Conditions for Ecosystem Service Payments 4 (2008)
http://www.rff.org/Documents/08_Tropics_Conference/Tropics_Conference_Papers/Tropics_Conference_Wunder_
PES_markets.pdf. (hereinafter Wonder (2008)).
143
Id.
144
See Fikret Berkes, Community-Based Conservation in a Globalized World, Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the U.S.A., Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.pnas.org/content/104/39/15188.full (last visited
April 3, 2010). In implementing global accords such as the Kyoto protocol, according to the World Bank the key to
success in countries such as Bolivia and Costa Rica has been the linking of global ideas to domestic interests,
players, and political skills. “Attuned to ideas from abroad but deeply immersed in domestic social movements and
policy debates, these countries have been at the forefront of an impressive record of environmental policy
innovations.” The World Bank, World Development Report 2003, p. 161 http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2002/09/06/000094946_02082404015854/Render
ed/PDF/multi0page.pdf.
145
See, e.g., Daniel White, Africa: Exploring Parks and Partnerships Along the Zambezi, The Nature Conservancy
website http://www.nature.org/wherewework/africa/wherewework/art30703.html (last visited April 3, 2010)
(describing The Nature Conservancy’s new initiatives in community-based conservation); The World Bank,
Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World: Transforming Institutions, Growth, and the Quality of Life 161-162
(2003), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTBELARUS/Resources/328178-1118308098981/12448591118308125391/WDR2003Book.pdf; Margaret Southern, In Costa Rica, There’s Strength in Numbers, The Nature
Conservancy website http://www.nature.org/wherewework/centralamerica/costarica/features/art29695.html (last
visited April 3, 2010) (describing TNC’s work with local inhabitants to manage ecotourism); see Boli, supra note
135, at 344.
146
Stephen R. Kellert, Jai N. Mehta, Syma A. Ebbin & Laly L. Lichtenfeld, Community Natural Resource
Management: Promise, Rhetoric, and Reality, 13 Society & Natural Resources 705, 706 (2000); see Tomas M.
Koontz & Craig W. Thomas, What Do We Know and Need to Know About the Environmental Outcomes of
Collaborative Management?, 66 Public Administration Rev. 111 (2006).

24

to the legal systems and values of other people and countries and through utilization of
partnerships, will help to respect national and personal and national autonomy, culture and
heritage, and democratic values.147 Moreover, local input and cooperation may increase the
likelihood of success of the conservation program.148
Civil Law Hurdles to Private Conservation Easements
Assuming that a country desired to implement conservation easements after evaluating the
various policies, existing law may present obstacles. There are various reasons why traditional
civil law systems do not provide fertile ground for the adoption and use of conservation
easements. These include the prohibition of in gross interests, rejection of affirmative
obligations, and the numerus clausus principle. This would suggest that alterations to existing
rules or specific conservation “easement” legislation, as well as a shift in civil law
conceptualizations, would be required to permit private conservation easements in gross under
traditional civil law. While there are variations and exceptions among civil law countries, some
generalizations about the issues may be offered.
Prohibition on In Gross Interests
Traditional civil law regimes, stemming from the Roman model, do not recognize in gross
servitudes.149 Rather, they contemplate that a “predial” (aka “praedial”) servitude—i.e., a
property right running with the land150—can only be created between two pieces of land. For
example, the laws of France,151 Italy,152 South Africa,153 Greece,154 Quebec,155 and
Argentina156require a burdened and benefitted parcel. The Louisiana Civil Code, the only
American jurisdiction with a predominantly civil law tradition, similarly requires the existence of

147

See Mark Rosenthal, Sustainable Community Development: Integrating Environmental, Economic and Social
Objectives, 54 Progress in Planning73 (2000) (discussion democratic process).
148
See Fikret Berkes, Rethinking Community-Based Conservation, 18 Conservation Biology 621, 622 (2004)
(“More inclusive, people-oriented and community-based approaches to conservation are in part a reaction to the
failures of exclusionary conservation, in a world in which social and economic factors are increasingly seen as key
to conservation success.”). The data and results of community-based approaches are not yet clear. See Kellert et al,
supra note 146; Koontz & Thomas, supra note 146.
149
James Gordley & Arthur Taylor von Mehren, An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Private Law 198
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
150
4 A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Predial Servitudes § 3 (3d ed 2009, available on Westlaw);
see generally Paul McCarthy, The Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants in France and Belgium: Judicial Discretion
and Urban Planning, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1973).
151
French Civil Code arts. 637, 638, quoted in Gordley & von Mehren, supra note 149, at 198.
152
Italian Civil Code art. 1027, discussed in James Gordley, Foundations of Private Law: Property, Tort, Contract,
Unjust Enrichment 92 (Oxford Univ. Press 2006).
153
C.G. van der Merwe, The Law of Property in C.G. van der Merwe & Jacques E. du Plessis, Introduction to the
Law of South Africa, 201-242, at 224 (Kluwer Law International 2004). South African property law is mainly
influenced by Roman-Dutch law, rather than English common law. Id. at 201.
154
Greek Civil Code art. 1118, discussed in 4 A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Predial Servitudes
§§ 3, 9 (3d ed 2009.).
155
Quebec Civil Code § 1177, Westlaw S.Q. 1991, c. 64, s. 1177. .
156
Argentina Codigo Civil, Libro III, Titulo XII, art. 2.971,
http://www.justiniano.com/codigos_juridicos/codigos_argentina.htm.

25

two parcels of land to create a predial servitude.157 The requirement of a benefitted parcel
frustrates the basic model of in gross private conservation easements, where a nonprofit holds a
right over land without owning a neighboring property.
The rejection of in gross servitudes appears to be rooted in history, as Roman law required two
parcels.158 Scholars have noted that the post-Revolution, 19th century French civil code generally
sought to limit servitude law as it had been expanded during feudal times as a means for lords to
exact additional income from tenants.159 Commentators have also suggested that the requirement
of both dominant and servient lots helps to “avoid the proliferation and undue encumbrance of
the land,”160 echoing some of the anti-restrictions proclamations of common law courts.161
Some proponents of land restrictions have argued that “conservation easements” are permissible
under the current legal systems of Latin American and have in fact been created.162 They claim
that it is possible to create a real property right that could restrict an owner from doing certain
things (presumably altering environmental features) on the property. These rights, however, are
not true “conservation easements” as understood in the U.S. context as they require that such
agreements be between two property owners.163 This would require the NGO to purchase a
property neighboring or somehow related to every parcel on which they seek a conservation right
in order to “anchor” it. This would add at the minimum great expense and in some cases it may
be impossible as a practical matter to acquire an anchor. The civil code tradition of Latin
America and its rejection of in gross rights frustrate the efficacy of the conservation concept. It
appears that as of 2005, all “conservation easements” in Latin American have been appurtenant
rather than in gross.164
A few civil law countries have more recently adopted an interest often known as a “limited
personal servitude” which serves as a charge on the servient land in favor of a person rather than
a dominant property.165 German166 and Greek167 codes provide for such rights, which might
include the right to take fruit from a property or fishing or hunting rights.168 Even in the few
civil law nations that have adopted limited personal servitudes, this interest is not likely a
sufficient vehicle for a conservation restriction as limited personal servitudes are typically not
157
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transferable169 and not perpetual. Rights held by individuals terminate on death, and those held
by juridical beings terminate upon dissolution170 or after a period of years set by the code.171
Proponents of U.S. conservation easements found these types of shortcomings to be antithetical
to successful restrictions.172
Affirmative Obligations on Servient Owner
Moreover, traditional civil law does not recognize a servitude that creates an affirmative
obligation on the servient owner, but rather typically prevent the servient holder from performing
acts on the property (such as a building restriction) or give the dominant owner the right to do
something on the burdened land (such as a right of way).173 There are some examples, though,
of civil law courts allowing an affirmative obligations ancillary to an otherwise valid predial
servitude,174 but it is risky to rely on such judicial leniency in light of code provisions that do not
contemplate affirmative duties on the servient. Thus, in a civil law regime a conservation
servitude might not be enforceable to the extent that it obligates the servient owner to perform
affirmative acts,175 such as maintenance of the easement area,176 that are typically required in
U.S. conservation easements.
Numerus Clausus and the Limits on Judicial Law
Finally, the doctrine of “numerus clausus” (literally, “the number is closed”)177 prevents parties
and courts in civil law countries from creating property interests not specifically recognized by
the governing code.178 The code is recognized as the sole source of the law, and the numerus
clausus concept is an express corollary of that concept.179 The code will typically delineate the
types and content of absolute property rights, such as mortgages and servitudes, defining what
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each right means and bestows.180 The parties cannot create by contract or transfer rights not
recognized in the code, nor can the courts invent new obligations; the only way to increase or
decrease the types of interests of the rights is by legislation to amend the code.181 The principle
of numerus clausus also exists, albeit not by that name, in other code-based countries such as
China.182
The numerus clausus rule, combined with a law of servitudes that allows only a limited number
of discrete interests, has the effect of denying property owners the freedom to carve out efficient,
personally rewarding, and socially beneficial property rights. Under the common law system,
however, courts have power along with legislatures to make binding, precedential law.
Moreover, there is no formal doctrine of numerus clausus in the common law, and courts have
expanded legal rights and interests significantly based on the agreements of the parties and
public policy considerations.183 Much of the pioneering of conservation easements in the United
States came by parties operating under the common law ground rules that provide that courts
have the power to legitimize newly developing property interests by extending, manipulating,
and sometimes overruling existing doctrines.184 Thus, the early proponents of conservation
easements claimed that no enabling statutes were necessary to validate these interests and
maintained that the judicial system could and would ultimately sustain these interests.185 These
proponents made the case for convincing courts of the validity of conservation easements based
on minority-view American case law and policy.186
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Other Property System Issues
Additionally, other variations in property rights concepts in civil law and non-civil law countries
present hurdles to the adoption of American-style conservation easements.
Adequate Title Systems and Enforcement
As a fundamental prerequisite, there must be a sufficiently developed property rights regime in a
given country to sustain investment in and enforcement of a conservation easement right. The
conservation restriction must be clearly recognized and accepted by parties and the legal system,
so that people will be willing to enter into such arrangements without high premiums for
transaction costs or discounts for uncertainty. There also must be a registration system to
adequately demonstrate that the purported owner of the property has title to the land sufficient
for the conveyance of an easement, and the system must accept an in rem conservation right for
registration or recording.187 Additionally, there must be a sufficient rule of law to enforce
conservation easement rights and to deter potential violators. Ownership and enforcement rights
must extend to non-domestic entities if global NGOs hold the interests, or sufficient local
partners or affiliates must hold the conservation right. Without reliable and defensible title for
the grantor and grantee of a conservation right, parties will be unlikely to enter into such
transactions.
Communal Rights
Some legal systems may include other property interests that run counter to privately held
conservation rights. For example, the Swedish tradition of “allemansratt” permits any person to
have passage over and to camp on woodlands and fields owned by others, as well as the right to
gather wild flowers and mushrooms.188 Conservation easements barring changes in the
environmental condition of such lands would run afoul of this tradition. Similarly, extensive
practice of “common lands” in some legal systems may prevent the acquisition of conservation
easements since there may be no “owner” with authority to grant rights over the common land.189
Finally, squatters may have acquired rights of ownership trumping that of record owners.190
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Private Conservation Alternatives to “In Gross Conservation Easements”
When other nations encounter legal or policy impediments to employing in gross private
conservation easements, in some countries NGOs may employ other consensual less-than-fee
vehicles to preserve environmental conditions.191 (These are in addition to appurtenant
servitudes for conservation purposes which may be,192 and have been,193 created under the civil
law.) While these alternatives may not have all the features of U.S.-style conservation easements
because of limited duration, an appurtenancy requirement, lack of in rem status, and limited
scope, etc. they may, however, be appropriate interim or final resolutions in light of a particular
country’s social and economic aspirations, title issues, and legal structure.
Payments for Environmental Services
One alternative to the American-style conservation easement is a privately financed “Payment
for Environmental Services,” known as PES (or by similar names such as a “Conservation
Performance Payment.”)194 These are contracts requiring payments on a set schedule by a
private party to a landowner for refraining from environmental degradation of the land.195 As
contracts, they should be enforceable in both common law, civil law, and most other legal
systems, subject to local requirements. Private funders of PESs may include “service users,”
such as a safari operator interested in preserving landscape values for its business or a water
company seeking to maintain the integrity of its watershed, or NGOs seeking to vindicate
ecological goals.196 The term of a PES is limited, typically short term, with the parties able to
renew the arrangement, perhaps at a longer term.197
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The limited term of the PES is a great disadvantage when compared to the perpetual preservation
of a conservation easement. The environmental benefits of a PES will last only as long as
payments (and funding for payments) continue.198 Moreover, as a purely contractual
arrangement, it does not appear that the typical PES would be an in rem right, enforceable
against the land itself and binding purchasers of the preserved land.199 There is some confusion
on terminology, as it appears that some non-perpetual, non-in rem, contract-based rights between
landowners are sometimes referred to as “conservation easements,” perhaps because that term is
considered a gold standard in conservation efforts. But in reality, rights not assertable against
the property itself, for short terms should not fairly be described as conservation easements. For
example, one line of the literature describes the rights held by the government in Costa Rica as
PES arrangements,200 while others trumpet them as conservation easements.201 The only way to
truly tell is through close analysis of the governing legislation and documentation of each
transaction. Attempting to label the interests does not advance understanding and may reinforce
concerns about the imposition of American legal vehicles.202
PESs have some useful features. First, by casting these as contract rights, parties avoid the rule
of most civil law regimes that bar the enforcement of an in gross property right.203 Acquisition
of a contract right by a global NGO also might be seen by a host country and its citizens as less
foreign intrusion than the purchase of a fee or lesser property interest. Moreover, when land titles
in the country are insecure, the limited term prevents the NGO from paying up front for a longer
(or perpetual) conservation right where title is not enforceable or the “owner” in reality lacks
title. The structure of ongoing payments forces the owner to continue to comply for the entire
term of the PES in order to receive compensation.204 The owner thus has an incentive to protect
the environment and dynamic between the owner and the environmental NGO shifts from
adversarial to collaborative.205 Compared to a conservation easement, the landowner has an
interest in compliance (something that is not always the case with U.S. owners subject to
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conservation easements.)206 Finally, as with conservation easements, PESs offer the benefits of
private acquisition, NGO administration, and a consensual rather than a regulatory approach.207
There has been limited use of PES programs involving nongovernmental entities in Latin
America, Asia, and Africa.208 Some noteworthy examples include an arrangement by a nonprofit
(Fundacion Natura) in Los Negros, Bolivia to protect threatened cloud forest habitat of migratory
birds209 and a contract obtained by Cedenera, an NGO, to protect watershed in Pimampiro,
Ecuador210 A 2006 inventory of PES projects in Sub-Sahara Africa found only 18 projects, only
a minority of which were performance based—i.e., true PESs.211 In contrast, Latin America has
a larger number of PES arrangements.212 This disparity has been attributed to weaker financial
condition of potential purchasing entities in Africa,213 especially high transaction costs,214 and
less reliable legal enforcement of contracts.215
Chile’s Proposed Derecho Real de Conservacion
There is currently a legislative proposal in Chile to create a new right under the Chilean civil
code called a derecho real de conservacion (i.e., a real right of conservation).216 The proposal
expressly denotes the interest as a real estate right,217 permits it to be held by nonprofit
organizations as well as government,218 and allows for perpetual duration.219 There is no
requirement that the right be appurtenant to a benefited property, thus in gross rights should be
permitted. The right is for “environmental conservation” goals, defined as protection of
biodiversity, species, habitat, and ecosystems as well as the prevention of environmental
deterioration.220 The legislation also allows the interest holder a right of access to inspect the
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burdened property to determine compliance.221 As of this writing, the proposal is still pending in
the legislature.
There are several salutary aspects to the Chilean approach. First, the legislative proposal resulted
from collaboration of The Nature Conservancy (an American NGO also engaged in global
issues)222 with local constituencies interested in conservation activities and in creating a lasting
conservation right, thus bringing outside expertise to in-country stakeholders and decision
makers.223 Second, there were indications that the social, economic, and political conditions in
Chile were ripe for the creation of a property-based, long-term conservation right.224
Additionally, the proposed legislation does not attempt to impose the common law conservation
easement on civil law, but rather offers a new interest—the derecho real de conservacion-- that
would be embraced by the civil code.225 This flexible, locally-based approach finesses the
concerns of “legal imperialism” and respects existing legal regimes.
Leases
If in gross servitudes are not legally permitted for fees, a sale-leaseback arrangement could be
employed to create in gross conservation restrictions attached to the leasehold rights. For
example, in England easements226 and covenants227 are not enforceable in gross against
successors.228 So, a conservation organization could not acquire a conservation easement from a
fee owner. If, however, the owner conveyed the fee to an NPO, the organization could lease the
property back to the former fee owner on a long term, automatically renewable lease, but
including an express conservation covenant binding the tenant not to disturb ecological
features.229 The former owner would have full right of possession as tenant; and, since
covenants in leaseholds are enforceable by the landlord against the tenant in England and the
lease can be assigned by either the landlord or tenant,230 the conservation covenant would bind
successors to the leasehold estate. The preservation goal can thus be achieved.
The difficulty with this approach is that many owners would likely be unwilling to relinquish fee
ownership in this manner even though the leasehold will give them and their successors
221
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potentially infinite possession. This arrangement may be more acceptable in countries where
residential ground leases are common, such as in portions of England.231
Easements Controlled by Government
By definition, a private conservation easement is held and enforced by a private (nonprofit)
organization. Governmentally owned conservation easements are common in the U.S.,232 but by
definition they do not offer the benefits of private initiative and action.
In other countries, especially civil law countries where private easements in gross would
challenge existing legal paradigms, a good first step towards conservation property rights held by
NGOs might be the adoption of governmental conservation property rights. By way of example,
depending on definition, some of Costa Rica’s governmentally held rights may be considered
true conservation easements.233
Three Mexican states have enacted legislation that permits conservation easements to be held by
NGOs provided that the easements are approved by the government and the easement land
becomes part of the state protected conservation land system.234 While the requirement of
government approval may inject the difficulties of bureaucracy and governmental inaction, the
involvement of government does help to address the concerns with current acquisition of
American private conservation easements where there is no community or regional planning to
set up an integrated easement plan.235 Governmental approval of easements is not necessarily a
roadblock to success of a conservation easement program, providing there is a reasonably
efficient, transparent bureaucracy. For example, conservation easements have thrived in
Massachusetts which is the one U.S. state that requires both local and state approval of
conservation easements.236
Usufruct
Under civil law regimes, property owners can create a right of usufruct in another person. While
there are differences between countries, usufructs generally grant the holder the right to use and
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enjoy the land, subject to the obligation to preserve the property.237 More specifically, the holder
of a usufruct has the right to possession and “to derive the utility, profits, and advantages” that
the property may produce.238 Usufructs can be created only for a limited time period.239
Typically usufructs expire on the death of the holder.240 For juridical persons, such as
corporations, the traditional civil code approach is to limit the duration of a usufruct to twenty241
or thirty years,242 though some countries have recently extended the duration of the usufruct to
the potentially infinite “life” of the entity.243
There are a variety of approaches and much nuance244 on the transferability of a usufruct. Some
civil codes bar transferability in all cases,245 others prohibit transferability unless the parties
provide otherwise,246 and still others permit transferability as a matter of right provided the
transferor makes certain guarantees to the owner of the underlying property. 247 There are also
differences among commentators as to whether a purchaser of the underlying property is bound
by a pre-existing usufruct.248
Usufructs have been used to create conservation restrictions by the owner granting the right to
enjoy conservation values to a conservation group.249 One benefit of this device is that there is
no need for a second parcel of land—the conservation group holds the usufruct in the restricted
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property that is ultimately owned by the owner. A disadvantage of usufructs is that they usually
have a limited duration and cannot be the basis of a long term conservation solution. Moreover,
a usufruct may give the transferee conservation group far more rights than necessary (i.e.,
possession) and responsibilities (e.g., maintenance of the property) than are required to achieve
conservation goals.
Conservation Easements in Other Common Law Jurisdictions
There are a number of common law jurisdictions that have adopted conservation easement
statutes that contain some or even many features of the American model.250 Many are former
British colonies (at least for some period of time) which is ironic, as England itself still prohibits
easements in gross does not allow covenants in gross to run,251 and has not enacted conservation
easement legislation.
Two civil law jurisdictions—Louisiana and Quebec—have also adopted conservation
“easement” legislation. These jurisdictions are noteworthy as they exist in federations of states
or provinces that otherwise follow the common law. These statutes indicate how at least two
jurisdictions attempted to integrate a common law vehicle into an essentially civil law model,
and the choices they made.
African Countries
A number of African countries have adopted legislation providing for conservation easements of
some type. This is noteworthy Like the American model, Uganda for example, permits
perpetual,252 in gross253 “environmental easements” for various purposes including preservation
of flora and fauna, view, ecological and physical features, open space, and water quality.254 The
Ugandan environmental easement is not consensual, however, as the easement is created not by
agreement of the parties but by a decision of a court on the application of a “person or group of
persons.”255 The applicant is required to compensate the landowner for the lost value of the use
of the land256 though the government may pay the compensation if the easement is of national
importance.257 This nonconsensual creation diverges from the spirit and provisions of the
American model. It carries the baggage of all compulsory takings, but perhaps may be worse as
it is initiated by private parties (not government) and made effective by the judiciary (not the
legislature) without the requirement of a carefully, determined plan.258 Kenya259 in 1999 adopted
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an environmental easement statute virtually identical to the Ugandan legislation and Tanzania in
2004 passed a statute with many of the same features.260
Canada
Canadian provinces have adopted private conservation easement enabling legislation.261 These
statutes generally resemble the American model by specifically providing for nonprofit
ownership,262 in gross interests, 263 perpetual ownership if desired by the parties,264 and typical
environmental preservation purposes.265 Like the American model, there is no requirement of
government approval in creation of a conservation easement held by an NPO. On the
termination and modification issue, the statutes sometimes exhibit mixed signals. For example,
the Nova Scotia legislation attempts to ensure the viability of conservation easements to a greater
extent than other easements or covenants by expressly stating that conservation easements do not
lapse solely by reason of non-enforcement, change in the use of the servient land, or changed
conditions in the surrounding land.266 At the same time, though, the legislation permits the court
to grant to the servient owner or “Her Majesty” any relief or remedy available at common law. 267
Such language might be applied to allow the government to seek modification of a conservation
easement if and when the public interest requires, so providing needed flexibility into a perpetual
private conservation arrangement.
Australia
Some Australian states have adopted legislation that permits a conservation covenant held by a
specific conservation trust created in the statute.268 Thus, there is no authorization for nonprofits
generally to hold conservation restrictions. The members of the statutory conservation trust are
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appointed by a government official, thus placing the trust under a degree of governmental
control.269 The conservation restriction is therefore not fully a “private” interest.
There is significant governmental involvement in the operation and administration of Australian
conservation covenants. Acquisition, amendment, and release of a covenant must be approved
by a government official, after a period of public input.270 This has benefits in that it ensures that
the restrictions serve public conservation goals and prevents the release of beneficial covenants;
the costs, though, are the introduction of potential red tape and the loss of nonprofit initiative.
One interesting provision states that when the parties are unable to agree on the release of a
covenant, “the matter shall be determined by” a governmental official.271 Again, this is a doubleedged sword as it addresses the perpetuity problem by providing flexibility but potentially
weakens conservation goals.
Hybrids: Louisiana and Quebec
Louisiana and Quebec present interesting examples as they are primarily civil law jurisdictions
within a federal system comprised of other entities following the common law. Both Louisiana
and Quebec have adopted statutes allowing for NPOs to participate in conservation efforts,
though Quebec’s solution is less similar to the model used in the U.S. and the other Canadian
provinces. These civil code regimes have modified the common law model, apparently to fit
other facets of their legal systems.272
In 1986, Louisiana added a statue providing for a “conservation servitude” that is substantively
consistent with many of the provisions of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act: conservation
servitudes are unlimited in duration unless the document provides otherwise, they can be held by
NPOs, and they are enforceable like other servitudes.273 Interestingly, there is no specific
authorization of in gross ownership, leaving one to wonder whether the general Louisiana Code
requirement of appurtenancy would apply to conservation servitudes.274 If in gross ownership is
in fact barred, Louisiana would lack a key feature of the American conservation easement model.
Quebec contemplates more governmental involvement than even Louisiana, let alone other
Canadian provinces. A nonprofit can apply jointly with a land owner for recognition of the
owner’s land as a “nature reserve.”275 The agreement must indicate the conservation measures
that the owner will undertake and permitted and prohibited activities (presumably these could be
like restrictions in conservation easements). This agreement can last in perpetuity, or for a lesser
period. Unlike almost all conservation easement statutes, however, the nature reserve agreement
must be approved by the Minister in order for it to be valid.276 Amendments must be approved by
269

New South Wales Nature Conservation Act § 18; Victorian Act § 4.
Victorian Act §§ 3A(3), (5), (6), (8); see New South Wales Nature Conservation Act § 69B (requiring
government official along with Nature Conservation Trust to enter a conservation agreement).
271
Victorian Act § 3A(4).
272
See Kenneth C.G. Reid, The Idea of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 Tul. L. Rev. 5, 8 (2003-2004) (describing
Louisiana and Quebec as “mixed” civil law and common law jurisdictions).
273
La. Stat. Ann.-Rev. Stat., tit. 9, code book II, code tit., ch. 2, §§ 1271-1276.
274
See supra note 157 & accompanying text.
275
Natural Heritage Conservation Act, R.S.Q. c-61.55., .54.
276
Id. at c-61.57, .60.
270

38

the Minister and nature reserve agreements may be terminated by the Minister on his own
initiative if certain conditions are met.277 While this article has explored the potential benefits of
some increased governmental involvement in some situations involving conservation easements,
the Quebec approach may threaten the vibrancy of NPO activities in conservation.
Conclusion
Nation states residing in our global community face difficult choices on the allocation and
utilization of their limited, valuable land. Governmental entities can accomplish a great deal in
conserving these resources. There is a role, however, for private organizations in the
preservation effort. One relatively recent, successful, and game changing conservation device in
the United States has been the in gross conservation easement acquired and stewarded by a
nonprofit organization. This article has suggested that other countries may find that some type of
private conservation restriction is a helpful tool. But before so concluding, it is essential that a
nation examine its own unique culture, history, and aspirations to determine if such a private
device is suitable for it. And then the country can devise a legal structure, consistent with local
law, for the type of restriction that will best meet the country’s policy goals. It is far more likely
that conservation efforts will be successful following this strategy rather than through the
unthinking imposition of an unfamiliar, American-style, conservation easement.
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